Lily Cade is a “Gold Star Lesbian” porn performer who chooses not to shoot scenes with trans women.
Last night, Lily Cade was subjected to a barrage of tweets from trans activists and their allies (seemingly led by trans porn star, Chelsea Poe) demanding that she explain and justify her decision. Continue reading
The Connecticut Department of Insurance issued a Bulletin directing insurance companies to ensure that there is no discrimination against insured individuals with gender dysphoria and ensure that individuals are not denied access to “medically necessary care because of the individual’s gender identity or gender expression.”
Jessica Robin Durling is a male who “identifies as” a woman. He faced suspension from his Nova Scotia high school in April for using the women’s washroom. Before Durling could serve out the school’s punishment, the Chignecto-Central Regional School Board announced that his suspension would be dropped. The school board also said it will develop new guidelines for schools to address the needs of all students.
Durling also operates a Facebook page from which he accuses lesbians and gay men writing about observable facts as engaging in “hate speech.”
“Jessica” also operates a male Facebook account that connects to a male Facebook page, thus casting further doubt on the veracity of his “woman status.”
The applicant complained about the alleged unfairness of German court proceedings concerning his claims for reimbursement of sex reassignment measures against a private health insurance company. He further considered that the impugned court
decisions had infringed his right to respect for his private life.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 (right to a fair hearing) of the Convention. The German courts should have requested further clarification from a medical expert. With regard to the Court of Appeal’s reference to the causes of the
applicant’s condition, it could not be said that there was anything arbitrary or capricious in a decision to undergo sex reassignment surgery and the applicant had in fact already undergone such surgery by the time the Court of Appeal gave its judgment.
The proceedings, taken as a whole, had not satisfied the requirements of a fair hearing. The Court also held that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention. Since gender identity was one of the most intimate aspects of a person’s private life, it appeared disproportionate to require the applicant to prove the medical necessity of the treatment. No fair balance had been struck between the interests of the insurance company on the one hand and the interests of the individual on the other.
The case concerned the refusal by Max Schlumpf’s health insurers to pay the costs of his sex-change operation on the ground that he had not complied with a two-year period before gender reassignment surgery, as required by the case-law as a condition for payment of the costs of such operations.
The Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention. The waiting period had been applied mechanically without having regard to the age (67) of the applicant, whose decision to undergo an
operation was likely to be affected by that delay, thus impairing his “freedom to determine his gender identity.”
The case concerned a male-to-female transsexual who, prior to his sex reassignment, had had a son with his wife in 1998. They separated in 2002 and the applicant complained of the restrictions that had been imposed by the court on the contact arrangements with his son on the ground that his emotional instability after his change of sex entailed a risk of disturbing the child, then aged six.
The Court held that there had been no violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) of the Convention in conjunction with Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) to the Convention. It found that the restriction on contact had not
resulted from discrimination on the ground of the applicant’s transsexualism. The decisive ground for the restriction imposed by the Spanish courts, having regard to the applicant’s temporary emotional instability, had been the child’s well-being. They had
therefore made a gradual arrangement that would allow the child to become progressively accustomed to his father’s sex reassignment.